The Effect of Mortgage Refinancing on Money Demand and the Monetary Aggregates
ll~tONEY SERVES AS A medium of exchange for transactions involving financial instruments as well as real goods and services. Unfortunately, the total volume of tt-ansactions iti the economy is not observable. As a result, economic analyses of rnomiev demand typically focus on the t-elationship between the quantity of money demanded and the production of new goods and services, measured by either gross domestic product or personal consumption expenditures. Because aggregate volumes of financial and nonfinancial transactions likely move in par~tllelwith the output of new goods and services, the use of output rather than the volume of transactions may cost little in terms of understanding movements in the monetary aggregates. In some periods, however, events occur which remind us that this is not always the case. This article examnines the effect of one such ongoimig recent eventthe refinancimtg of residential mortgageson money demand.'
Simple models of the demand for money as a medium of exchange often implicitly assume that the purchase or sale of a good or service is completed within a relatively brief period. Unlike the transactiomis in these models, the refinancing of a r'esidential mortgage that has been securitized in the secondary market initiates a sequence of transactions that may continue for four to six weeks, or niore. During this time, the quantity of liquid deposits demanded increases. When the last transactiomi in the sequence is concluded, the quantity of deposits demanded falls back ceterus paribas to its earlier level.
Mortgage refinancing is an important phenomenon in the United States because most homes are financed with long-term, fixed-rate amortized mortgages that contain a ''put'' option, allowing the horrower to repay the outstanding principal amount of the loan at any time without pen alt~'. Homeownet-s typically exercise that option when mortgage rates fall significantly (1-2 percentage 1 Other recent examples include the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which boosted household liquid deposits in late 1986 and early 1987, and the closure of large numbers of thrifts by the Resolution Trust Corporation. Recognizing that special factors can significantly distort growth of the monetary aggregates, the Bach commission recommended that the Federal Reserve regularly undertake and publish studies of the effects of special factors; see Report of the Advisory Committee on Monetary Statistics (1976) . The Bank of England regularly publishes such analyses; see Pepper (1992 Pepper ( , 1993 and Topping and Bishop (1989) . points) below recent previous levels by taking out a new mortgage loan to repay the old. As shown in figure 1,2 extensive mortgage refinancing has occurred during two periods in the last decade, 1986-87 and 199 1-93. In the former, an initial surge in refinancing during 1986 was interrupted by a pause, before fears of rising market rates launched a second round in 1987. In the latter, three waves of refinancing -of increasing magnitude-mirm'om'ed the halting fall in long-term market interest rates. During 1992, for example, nearly one-fifth of all homeowners refinanced their mortgages.
3 In 1993, the volume of refinancing activity will surpass 1992's record pace.
The next section of this article describes the changes in the growth and volatility of liquid deposits and Ml that have occurred during periods of extensive mortgage refinancing. The article then examines the extent to which these changes may be related to increases in mortgage securitization. Finally, it explores whether recent fluctuations in the growth of other checkable deposits (OCD5) since 1991 also may be related to mortgage refinancing.
MORTGAGE REFINANCING AND

MONEY DEMAND
The increases in liquid deposits that have accompanied accelem'ations in mortgage refinancing since mid-1990 are shown in figure 2. The link betweemi mortgage refinancing and liquid deposit growth is a stock adjustment process wherein the stock of liquid deposits responds to changes in the flow of m'efimiancings. When the pace of mortgage refinancing increases, as it did during late 1991, the third quarter of 1992 and the second quarter of 1993, liquid deposit growth accelerates. As refinancings continue at the higher rate, deposit levels converge to the new desired level and deposit growth slows. When refinancing activity subsides-as in mid-1992 and early 1993-liquid deposit growth slows further and deposits may run off.
Through its effect on liquid deposits, mortgage refinancing sharply increased the volatility of Ml during both 1986-87 and 1991-93, as shown in figure 34 At the same time, the volatility of the broadem' aggregate M2, shown in figure 4, apparently was only slightly affected. In large part, the lower sensitivity of M2 to mortgage refinancing reflects the much smaller share of transaction deposits in M2 (about 20 percent) than in Ml (about 70 percent). The small changes that do appear in the volatility of M2 closely resemble changes in its non-MI component.
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The ability of increases in mortgage m'efinancing to affect the level and volatility of liquid deposits and Ml is in part due to the borrowed reserves operating procedure used by the Federal Reserve to control the growth of M2. During the last decade, this operating procedure has largely evolved into one that closely stabilizes the federal funds rate about a level thought to he consistent with the desired amount of discount window borrowing and the growth of M2. To maintain the desired levels of the federal funds rate and discount window borrowing, transitory imicreases in the demand for reserves are automatically accommodated with increases in the supply of nonborrowed reserves. 6 2 ln the figure, the volume of refinancing activity is proxied No such correlations between refinancing-related deposit inflows and nontransaction funding sources are apparent in the data, however. 6 For an analysis of the borrowed reserves procedure and its relationship to federal funds rate targeting, see Thornton (1988) . For a careful discussion of why and how reservesbased targeting procedures evolve into federal funds rate targets, see Meulendyke (1990) . Shaded areas are periods of heavy refinancing activity.
THE ROLE OF MORTGAGE SECURITIZATION
The increase in mortgage securitization during the last decade has increased the potential for mortgage refinancing to affect the growth of the monetary aggregates.
7 'The sale of mortgages in the secondary market creates an additional financial instrument-the mortgage-backed security, or NIBS-and involves a number of additional firms in the mortgage process, including the originators of the mortgages, the assembler of the mortgage pool (who also issues the MBS5), the servicer of the mortgage pool (who collects monthly payments and disburses funds to investors) and, typically, at least one government agency. The refinancing of securitized mortgages thus beconies a circuitous calling and refunding
of relatively large amounts of long-term, publicly held debt. Elevated levels of liquid deposits may persist for four to six weeks or more, until all related transactions are settled.
Legally, mortgage securitization entails combining a fixed pool of mortgages imito a trust. The mortgages serve as collateral for MBSs sold against the trust. The servicer of the MBSs, as a trustee, collects payments from homeowners and passes them through without taxation to the holders of the MBSs. Liquidity of the MBSs is enhanced by obtaining a third-party guarantee covering the payments that will be due to investors if homeowners pay at the scheduled, minimum contract rate. Three federal-governmnent-sponsored enterprises, known as 'agencies," dominate that business.t For a fee, these agencies guarantee the payment of principal and interest on securities backed by pools of Duca (1990) for an analysis of the interactions between demand deposits and mortgage refinancing during 1986-87.°A small amount or MBSs is issued without agency guarantees. Bank of America issued the first such private mortgage pool in 1977. In 1992, private mortgage pools represented only 8 percent of all outstanding pools. For background, see Downs (1985) and Pavel (1986) .°T heprecise nature of the guarantee varies somewhat by agency. ONMA and FNMA guarantee timely (within the month) payment of principal and interest, regardless of payments by the borrower, FHLMC guarantees timely payment of interest and eventual (within the year) payment of principal. In addition to issuing guarantees on MBSs backed by privately assembled mortgage pools, FNMA and FHLMC may purchase mortgages outright and market MBSs backed by pools of those mortgages. In 1992, for example, FNMA "issued" (guaranteed) $194 billion in MBSs. Of that amount, about $13 billion were originated by FNMA itself; the balance was originated by private lenders under a FNMA guarantee plan. FNMA's 1992 Annual Report emphasizes the off-balance-sheet contingent risk nature of these securities: "MBS are not assets of the corporation IFNMAI, except when acquired for investment purposes, nor are the related outstanding securities recorded as liabilities. However, the corporation is liable under its guarantee to make timely payment of principal and interest to investors. The issuance of MBSs creates guaranty fee income with Fannie Mae assuming credit risk, but without assuming any debt refinancing risk on the underlying pooled mortgages." In 1992, FNMA recorded $834 million in guaranty fees. 
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have on balance increased in proportion to the outstanding stock except for significant surges during periods of refinancing. 'I'he increase in deposits that follows an inct-ease in mortgage refinancing activity may in part he traced to the mechanics of mortgage securitization and servicing. Mortgage servicers' handling of the unscheduled principal payments associated with refinancings is governed by the rules of the federal agency that guam'antees the MBSs issued against the mortgage pool. In general, these rules require that mortgage servicers hold unscheduled principal payments in special custodial accounts during the interval between receipt from homeowners and disbursement to NIBS investors. GNMA requires that these custodial accounts be non-interest-bearing demand deposits. FNMA allows funds to he held in interest-bearing accounts as long as they are imnmediately available without prior notice of withdra' 1 val. FFILMC's rules are similar to ENMA's.
A surge in refinancing greatly increases the monthly average amount of funds held in liquid deposits by a mortgage servicer. In a typical month without refinancing, a set-vicer holds a homeowner's mortgage payment for a relatively brief period of time (up to 15 days) before remittance to investors. Following a mortgage refinancing, however, the servicer will hold the unpaid principal balance of the extinguished mortgage loan-an amount perhaps 10 to 100 (or-more) times as large as the homeowner's regular monthly principal payment-in a custodial account for a much longer period, often two to six weeks (see the shaded insert)."
Estimates of the size of this effect on monthly growth rates of demand deposits, Ml and M2, are shown in figure 6.12 When MBS liquidations accelerate, the growth rates of demand deposits and Ml after removing the MI3S effect are smaller than the published growth rates. Conver'selv, when MBS liquidations slow, the NIBSadjusted growth rates are larger than the published rates. Overall, the estimated differences in growth rates equal in some months as mnuch as one-half of the change in MI. F'rom Decemher 1991 to March 1992, for example, inflows to mortgage servicers' custodial accounts are estimated to have added hetween 5 to 10 percentage poitils to the monthly growth rates of demand deposits. 'l'he largest estimated effects were in October 1992 and May 1993, when MUS-related inflows likely accounted for four-fifths and three-fifths, respectively, of demand deposit growth. In both cases, deposit growth slowed sharply in later months when deposit levels had increased enough to support the accelera ted pace of mnortgage activity. Subsequemitly, during the first quarter of 1993, runoffs of servicers' custodial balances likely depressed monthly average deposit growth by as much as 10 percentage points.
'these patterns show through to Ml (see the center panel of figure 6 ) but are muted. Currency and OCDs, which comprise two-thirds of Nil, are unlikely to he affected by MBS activity." Nonetheless, the distortions to demand deposits are sufficient that monthly growth rates of MI since mid-1992 appear to ha~•'ebeen distorted by as much as 5 to 7 percentage IJoints. Similar estimates for M2 that include estimated effects on money market demand account (MMDA) balances are shown in the hottormi panel of the figure.
Overall, fluctuations in mortgage servicers' ttWhile it is always risky to forecast financial market activity, recent decreases in mortgage rates (through October 1993) are likely to trigger substantial further increases in refinancing and MBS activity during late 1993 and early 1994. In addition to older mortgages issued during the 1980s, mortgages that were issued as little as 12 to 18 months ago at 7 to 7-112 percent rates now may profitably be refinanced. Rather than the pace of refinancing slowing and related distortions to the monetary aggregates diminishing as the outstanding stock of seasoned MBSs are rolled over, recent rate decreases have placed nearly the entire outstanding stock of MBSs "in the money" for rollover. 1t Homeowners typically make monthly mortgage payments between the 1st and 15th of the month, with the servicer ing a refinancing, the funds received by the servicer from the homeowner (at any time within the month) are placed in a custodial account, These funds are remitted by the servicer to MBS investors after the middle of the following month. The exact date, however, depends on the contract specifications of the agency guarantee program under which the M8Ss backed by the mortgage pool that contained the extinguished mortgage were issued, See, for example, Karcher (1989) . "Construction of these estimates is discussed in the appendix. "The next section raises the possibility that OCD balances also might have been affected by refinancing since 1991, remitting these funds to M6S investors on the 15th. Followalbeit not through MBS-related transactions. 
REFINANCING
The estimates may be biased dot~nwaid, however, for a number of reasons. The most In addition to demand deposits, changes in nportant perhaps is the omission ot any in OCDs since mid-1991 also have reflected the crease in deposits held by issuers of new MBSs. ebbs and flows in the pace of mortgage As some issuers draw on bank warehouse refinancing (ste the upper panel of figure 7 ).
credit lines to fumJd the purchase of mortgages I lie apparent increase in the correlation of to be assembled into new MBS pools, they may
Of Ds with demand deposits contrasts with its offs.t part of the hank charges for these lines behavior before 1991 and during 1986-87, the via earnings credits ha ed on their deposit let' latter shown in the lower panel of figut e 7. Should some poi-tion of the OCD fluctuations to mortgage activity is necessar ilv less direct during 1991-93 be attributed to mortgage reand more circumstantial than that for demand financing activity? If so, and if the impact of redeposits. I racing direct links between housefinanctng on OCUs were similar to its effect on hold deposits and economic activity is generally demand deposits, then their combined effects not possible, since the Federal Reserẽ collects could account for as much as three-quarters of deposit data from the issuers of deposits such as Ml's growth during a number ol months since banks and thrifts rather than from the o~net s of Home equity lending at banks, shown in figure   8 , also has been weak since mid-1991, with reports suggesting that homeowners are indeed repaying outstanding home equity loans with cash withdrawn at the time of a mortgage refinancing.
While the growth in OCDs likely reflects changes in households' deposits, some professionals and small businesses also may account for a portion of the increase. Some real estate payment practices tend to increase the demand for OCDs when mortgage activity increases. I'he This supportive yet largely circumstantial evidence leaves a number of unanswered questions.
If a household extracts funds at refinancing to repay a home equity loan, how long will it keep the funds in a liquid deposit? And isn't the amount of funds almost surely far smaller than the amounts held by mortgage servicers, associated with MBS refunding activity? If so, can the "These provisions do not apply to home purchases, nor to refinancings with the same lender for an amount equal to or less than the unpaid principal balance. The Act exempts from right-of-rescission provisions residential mortgage transactions' which are defined in the Act as extensions of credit to acquire a principal residence. In May 1987, at the request of mortgage market participants, refinancings with the same lender were exempted from Regulation Z. At the time, it was felt that this change likely would significantly reduce the number of refinancings subject to right-ofrescission provisions.
16 0n the eligibility of lawyers to hold a client's funds in OCD 
SUMMARY
Any factors that increase the demand for transaction deposits can distort the growth of the monetary aggregates over significant periods of time. Recent waves of mortgage refinancing activity have caused significant fluctuations in liquid deposits and Ml. Under current Federal Reserve operating procedures for controlling the growth of M2, such transitory changes in the demand for liquid deposits, like those associated with mortgage refinancing, at-c automatically accommodated through changes in bank reserves, leading to increased volatility of Ml -A large portion of this increased volatility of demand deposits can be traced to fiduciary rules governing the custodial accounts of mortgage servicers. The mechanism generating parallel high-frequency movements in OCDs, however, is far less clear. The coincidence of its timing with changes in refinancing activity and the onset of unusual weakness in home equity lending in 1992 suggest that it may be related to the ongoing restt'uctur'ing of household balance sheets during the 1990s. (Federal National Mortgage Association, 1992 For l"NMA servicers, the proportion of incoming funds placed in MMDAs rather than demand deposits (IVIA 'IDA share) . A value of 0.25 is assumed below,' Funds in M MUAs are assumed to remain on deposit for the same nutnber of days as funds placed in demand deposit accounts.
_______
Monthly liquidation of GNMA-guaranteed MBSs equals, by definition, the amount of GNMAguaranteed MRSs issued during the month minus the change in the amount of GNMA-guaranteed 
